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THE SAGA CONTINUES – TRYING TO FIND A BALANCE IN 
CERCLA’S PRP LIABILITY SUITS 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Note illustrates the enormous complexity and confusion circuit 
courts and potentially responsible parties face when attempting to determine 
liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA).  Part II provides the reader with background 
information on CERCLA, its provisions, and its amendments.  Part III 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s unpopular decision in Cooper Industries v. 
Aviall Services, Inc., and that decision’s impact on CERCLA litigation.  
Part IV examines the Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify the Cooper 
Industries decision in United States v. Atlantic Research Corporation and 
the gaps left open by that decision.  Part V studies how the circuit courts 
have struggled with the gaps left open by the Supreme Court rulings, 
especially when parties are facing consent decrees or administrative orders.  
Lastly, Part VI brings the holdings of the cases discussed together in a 
manner that can hopefully provide some guidance to parties facing potential 
liability for a contaminated site. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With human health, environmental quality, and millions of dollars on 
the line, parties trying to determine their liability pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) are forced to muddle through a perplexing piece of legislation 
combined with unsettling Supreme Court precedent.  Two crucial 
provisions of CERCLA, section 107 and section 113, determine a 
potentially responsible party’s (PRP’s) ability to recover from other PRPs.  
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The Supreme Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services1, turned 
years of precedent on its head, drastically narrowing a PRP’s ability to 
recover under a section 113 contribution claim.  The Supreme Court 
provided some guidance in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.2, but 
left many questions unanswered, leaving the daunting task of interpreting 
CERCLA’s liability provisions to the circuit courts, and PRPs baffled when 
it comes to taking action upon discovering a contaminated site they may be 
found liable for.  Although navigating through CERCLA’s liability 
provisions may be extremely frustrating, there are some steps a PRP can 
take to minimize its liability while being able to recover some of its 
incurred costs from other PRPs. 
II. CERCLA BACKGROUND 
CERCLA, also known as Superfund, was enacted to fill a gap in 
environmental protection caused by our nation’s abandoned and/or inactive 
hazardous waste sites.3  Passed in 1980, CERCLA became law after the 
citizens of the United States witnessed the tragic events that unfolded in 
Love Canal, New York.4  The passage of CERCLA is credited to the 
homeowners in Niagara Falls and the news coverage that brought the Love 
Canal incident and other hazardous waste sites around the nation into the 
national limelight.5 
Love Canal was anything but an isolated incident.  In fact, the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has suggested one in four 
Americans lives within three miles of a Superfund site.6  The events at Love 
Canal and other locations not only showed the “industry’s reckless 
 
1. 543 U.S. 157 (2004). 
2. Ronald E. Cardwell, Comprehensive, Environmental, Response, and Liability Act, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 509 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 20th ed. 2009). 
3. Id. 
4. Veronica Eady Famira, Cleaning Up Abandoned or Inactive Contaminated Sites, in THE 
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:  THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS 
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 570 (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008).  From 
approximately 1942-1954, Hooker Chemical company deposited approximately 25,000 tons of 
chemical waste in a canal near a Niagara Falls community.  ALLAN MAZUR, A HAZARDOUS 
INQUIRY:  THE RASHOMON EFFECT AT LOVE CANAL 9 (1998).  The canal was eventually filled 
and sold to the city to build an elementary school.  Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 120 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010).  Families moved to the area not knowing of the 
tremendous amount of toxic waste abutting their backyards.  Id.  The citizens became plagued 
with numerous health problems and complained for years until President Carter declared a federal 
emergency over what had become an “environmental ghetto.”  Id. (citing S. REP NO. 96-848, at 8-
10 (1980)). 
5. MAZUR, supra note 4, at 217. 
6. Famira, supra note 4, at 569. 
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disregard for environmental safety over the years,”7 but also convinced 
Congress that public health and the environment were at risk from 
contaminant releases from uncontrolled or abandoned sites.8  At its passage, 
CERCLA was viewed as an innovative tool to discover and clean up these 
nasty toxic sites.9 
CERCLA is commonly known as “Superfund” because the law created 
a special tax on the petroleum and chemical industries to fund the cleaning 
of hazardous waste sites.10  These funds are essential to ensure the prompt 
cleanup of the sites, as the EPA can take action without first determining 
who is liable for the contamination.11  Under CERCLA, the EPA is 
authorized to take remedial action when “any hazardous substance is 
released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the 
environment,”12 or when “there is a release or substantial threat of release 
into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an 
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.”13 
After the EPA cleans up a site, the agency can seek out those legally 
responsible for the contamination and recover its costs.14  The EPA does not 
have to conduct the initial cleanup itself however, and may subsequently 
pursue a cost recovery action against those responsible.  The EPA can also 
order the parties responsible for the hazardous site(s), known as PRPs, to 
clean up the site(s).15  Historically, CERCLA also allows “PRPs that [have] 
incurred cleanup costs . . . to seek contribution from other parties through 
collateral litigation.”16 
 
7. Hope Whitney, Cities and Superfund:  Encouraging Brownfield Redevelopment, 30 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 73 (2003). 
8. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 509. 
9. Famira, supra note 4, at 570. 
10. Id. at 570.  It is important to note that even though the petroleum industry was taxed to 
support Superfund, “CERCLA excludes crude oil or any of its refined fractions from the definition 
of hazardous substances.”  Id.  Caving to industry pressure, a Republican-led Congress allowed 
the tax to expire in 2005, causing the funding for today’s Superfund cleanups to come from the 
taxpayers.  John M. Broder, Without Superfund Tax, Stimulus Aids Cleanups:  $600 Million for 
Work at Polluted Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A16. 
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2006). 
12. Id. § 9604(a)(1)(A). 
13. Id. § 9604(a)(1)(B).  The release of a substance can mean many things, including “any 
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, 
dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, 
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or 
contaminant).”  Id. § 9601(22). 
14. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
15. Famira, supra note 4, at 570. 
16. Id. 
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A. CRITICISMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF CERCLA 
CERCLA is one of the most complex and daunting pieces of 
environmental legislation.17  “For those unfamiliar with CERCLA law and 
lore, finding, let alone understanding, CERCLA’s provisions can often be 
difficult.  Many of the procedures that apply in the typical CERCLA matter 
are set forth in layers of statutory, regulatory, and policymaking 
documents.”18  Such complexity logically leads to voluminous litigation.19  
In fact, CERCLA is famous for being subject to “more litigation than any 
other field of environmental law.”20 
Criticisms of CERCLA do not end with its complexity.  Industry has 
criticized the law for being too strict and costly while many members of the 
American public criticize the law for its slow pace of cleanup.21  Others 
have stated the law has not lived up to its expectations to set America’s 
hazardous waste problems right.22  Regardless of personal views regarding 
CERCLA, one criticism is shared by all: the cost of cleanup is 
tremendously expensive and intimidating.23 
Even with all these criticisms, there is no doubt CERCLA has 
significantly affected environmental policy.24  The EPA’s analysis of 
CERCLA verifies its significant impact in cleaning up hazardous waste 
sites around the country, resulting in improved public health and a cleaner 
environment: 
•EPA [through CERCLA] obligated nearly $443 million in 
appropriated funds, state cost-share contributions, and potentially 
 
17. 3 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02[1][a], at 4A-23 (1998).  
“CERCLA is a very complex piece of legislation, cross-referencing to, and relying on, prior laws 
that deal with toxic and hazardous pollution.  Moreover, the law had a stormy, contentious 
legislative history that left its mark on a hurried and technically imperfect draft of legislation.”  
Id.; 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES § 
8.1, at 470, 474 (1992).  “CERCLA is filled with the half-laws, teasers, and sleepers for which the 
environmental statutes are famous.”  RODGERS, supra, note 17 at 474.; Richard G. Opper, 
Managing Risk at Brownfield Sites, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 32, 36 (2006).  “We have seen 
CERCLA grow from its poorly drafted roots into a cost-recovery statute that is so burdened by its 
historic baggage that counsel for private cost-recovery plaintiffs have lost much of their 
enthusiasm for the remedy.”  Opper, supra, note 17. 
18. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 512. 
19. See JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 SUPERFUND AND BROWNFIELDS CLEANUP § 3:6 (2009-2008) 
(“CERCLA has been a lawyer’s full-employment opportunity act.”). 
20. GRAD, supra note 17, § 4A.01[5], at 4A-18. 
21. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 510. 
22. NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND 
ECONOMICS:  RECLAIMING THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA 749 (2008). 
23. MAZUR, supra note 4, at 218. “Superfund almost certainly is the most expensive 
environmental program ever enacted.”  Id.; Cardwell, supra note 3, at 510.  “To many on both 
sides of these issues, CERCLA has been an expensive failure.”  Cardwell, supra note 2, at 510. 
24. ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 22, at 749. 
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responsible party settlement resources for construction and post-
construction projects . . . . 
•EPA [through CERCLA] conducted 391 removal actions to 
address immediate and substantial threats to communities . . . . 
•[The EPA, through CERCLA] [p]laced 20 new sites on the 
NPL,25 and proposed 8 sites to the NPL.  The NPL had, at the end 
of FY 2010, 61 proposed sites and 1,627 final and deleted 
sites . . . . 
•EPA [through CERCLA] secured private party commitments of 
nearly $1.6 billion in FY 2010 to fund cleanup work . . . .26 
The criticisms and impacts mentioned above are real and will 
drastically affect a party who becomes involved with a Superfund site.27  
Part of what makes CERCLA so complicated is determining who is going 
to be held liable for the cleanup of these sites and, when there are multiple 
PRPs at a contaminated site, how much each party is going to pay.28  
Understanding the interaction between the varying liability provisions in 
CERCLA is critical for all parties facing Superfund litigation. 
B. THE LIABILITY PROVISIONS UNDER CERCLA 
When determining liability and payment for the cleanup of hazardous 
sites, it is important to remember the purpose of CERCLA, which is known 
as the “polluter pays” principle.29  The polluter pays principle is “the idea 
that those who benefited from their disregard [for the hazards posed by their 
pollution] should now pay to clean up the mess.”30  CERCLA has listed 
 
25. “The National Priorities List (“NPL”) is the list of national priorities among the known 
releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants throughout the 
United States and its territories.  The NPL is intended primarily to guide the EPA in determining 
which sites warrant further investigation.”  National Priorities List (NPL), EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2012). 
26. Superfund National Accomplishments Summary Fiscal Year 2010, EPA, http://epa.gov/ 
superfund/accomp/numbers10 htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2012).  See also Superfund Provides 
Communities with Significant Human Health, Environmental and Economic Benefits, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/benefits htm (last updated Apr. 9, 2012) (explaining 
CERCLA’s benefits “include reduction of threats to human health and ecological systems in the 
vicinity of Superfund sites, improvement of the economic conditions and quality of life in 
communities affected by hazardous waste sites, prevention of future releases of hazardous 
substances, and advances in science and technology”). 
27. See generally Opper, supra note 17, at 32, 36. 
28. See generally Morrison Enters., LLC v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 599 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining how the EPA ascertained one site’s contamination came from seven different source 
areas). 
29. Whitney, supra note 7, at 73. 
30. Id. 
          
2012] NOTE 215 
four broad categories of PRPs who can be found liable for the costs 
associated with Superfund sites: 
(1) the current owner or operator of a waste facility; (2) any 
previous owner or operator during any time in which hazardous 
substances were disposed at a waste facility; (3) any person who 
arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the 
waste facility; and (4) any person who transported hazardous 
substances to a waste facility.31 
Courts have found CERCLA imposes strict, joint, and several liability 
among this broad categorization of PRPs.32  This means “[a]ny PRP may be 
held responsible for the entire cost of cleanup, even if the PRP’s actual 
contribution to the contamination is limited.”33  This feature of CERCLA 
can have enormous significance to PRPs as the cost of cleaning up 
Superfund sites have considerably increased with each passing year,34 often 
times costing millions of dollars.35 
1. CERCLA Section 106 
Section 106 of CERCLA36 grants the EPA the authority to mitigate any 
“imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or 
the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous 
substance from a facility.”37  Section 106 also details the available penalties 
the EPA can levy on noncompliant parties.38  What makes section 106 such 
a valuable tool for the EPA is that it allows the agency to issue “such orders 
as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the 
 
31. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Centerior 
Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 347 n.8 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (2006))). 
32. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 530. 
33. Famira, supra note 4, at 571. 
34. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 524. 
35. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 164 (2004) (explaining how 
one party “incurred approximately $5 million in cleanup costs; the total costs may be even 
greater”); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 811 (1994) (detailing a settlement 
where Key Tronic agreed to pay 4.2 million dollars to the EPA and the Air Force agreed to pay 
1.45 million dollars); Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 215 n.19 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (listing the costs of five parties involved in the action, totaling $13,678,378.55); City of 
Emeryville v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing two settlements for site 
cleanups totaling over thirty-eight million dollars). 
36. Section 106 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2006).  For better readability, this Note will 
refer to sections of CERCLA rather than the U.S. Code for the majority of the text.  The footnotes 
will point to the appropriate codified section. 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).  Section 106 actions are available only to the EPA and are not 
available to private parties.  Cardwell, supra note 2, at 551.  Although section 106 is only 
available to the EPA, it is the “second major cause of action available under CERCLA.”  Id. 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b). 
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environment.”39  This means the EPA can direct a PRP, through a legally 
binding administrative order, to abate a release of hazardous substances.40 
The fines for willful noncompliance with an administrative order under 
section 106 are steep – up to twenty-five thousand dollars per day.41  
Further, if a party fails to comply with a section 106 administrative order, 
that party may be subject to putative damages of three times the cleanup 
costs incurred from the failure to take action.42  Given the power of the 
order and the magnitude of the fees, it is no surprise section 106 is viewed 
as “a valuable tool to commence cleanups promptly.”43 
2. CERCLA Section 107 
The most litigious portion of CERCLA,44 section 107, categorizes the 
four kinds of PRPs (listed above) and “permits the United States, individual 
states, or private parties to bring an action [against a PRP] to recover costs 
they have incurred in responding to a release or a threatened release of a 
hazardous substance.”45  “Section 107(a) has a six-year statute of 
limitations, and allows a plaintiff to recover 100% of its response costs 
from all liable parties, including those which have settled their CERCLA 
liability with the government.”46  Courts traditionally have applied section 
107 to “innocent parties” who may have not taken part in the 
contamination, but clean up the site anyway.47 
Section 107 does not have an express right to contribution, which is a 
different remedy than cost recovery.48  Contribution is defined as “[o]ne 
 
39. Id. § 9606(a). 
40. Famira, supra note 4, at 580. 
41. 42. U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1). 
42. Id. § 9607(c)(3). 
43. Famira, supra note 4, at 581. 
44. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 537. 
45. Id. 
46. Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 551 U.S. 
128 (2007).  A “response cost” is any cost associated with a removal or remedial action.  
Cardwell, supra note 2, at 547. 
Specific examples of recoverable response costs include costs associated with 
sampling and monitoring to assess and evaluate the extent of a release or threatened 
release; costs associated with detecting, identifying, controlling, and disposing of 
hazardous substances; and costs associated with investigating the extent of danger to 
the public or environment. 
Id. at 548.  Costs that have been found not to be recoverable as response costs are “medical 
monitoring costs, road repair and snow removal costs, and lost profits and general damages.”  Id. 
47. Randy J. Sutton, Innocent Owner Status under Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Annotation, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 161, 161 (2006). 
48. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3 (2004).  “The cost 
recovery remedy of § 107(a)(4)(B) and the contribution remedy of § 113(f)(1) are similar at a 
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tortfeasor’s right to collect from joint tortfeasors when – and to the extent 
that – the tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate share to the 
injured party, the shares being determined as percentages of causal fault.”49  
Initially, courts filled this gap in the law by recognizing a common law 
right to contribution claims between PRPs.50  Theoretically, without 
recognizing a right to contribution, a PRP could be held liable for the 
cleanup of an entire site (remember, courts have found CERCLA imposes 
strict, joint, and several liability)51 and not be able to recover some of the 
costs from other PRPs.52 
3. SARA Amendments and Section 113 
In 1986, Congress recognized the hazardous sites around the country 
were a larger problem than initially anticipated.53  It amended CERCLA in 
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), adding 168 
pages to the already complex CERCLA structure.54  The passage of SARA 
“solidifie[d] the reputation of the field for complexity, obscurity, and mind-
numbing detail.”55  Prior to the passage of SARA, courts read section 
107(a)(4)(B) as creating “an implied right of action for contribution for 
PRPs who had been sued under § 107, but had incurred response costs in 
excess of their pro rata share.”56  SARA explicitly gave PRPs the right of 
contribution: 
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is 
liable or potentially liable under section [107(a)] of this title, 
during or following any civil action under section [106] of this title 
or under section [107(a)] of this title . . . .  In resolving 
contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among 
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines 
are appropriate.  Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right 
of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of 
 
general level in that they both allow private parties to recoup costs from other private parties.  But 
the two remedies are clearly distinct.”  Id. 
49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (9th ed. 2009). 
50. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
51. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 530. 
52. See Niagara Mohawk, 596 U.S. at 121 n.8. 
53. GRAD, supra note 17, § 4A.02[1][a], at 4A-23. 
54. RODGERS, supra note 17, at 483.  An interesting note for North Dakotans is that SARA 
was signed by President Ronald Reagan on Air Force One over Grand Forks, North Dakota on 
October 17, 1986.  Id. at 484. 
55. Id. 
56. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
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a civil action under section [106] of this title or section [107] of 
this title.57 
Section 113(f)(3)(B) also gave an explicit right of contribution to a 
party who has “resolved its liability to the United States . . . for some or all 
of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement.”58  In other words, if a 
party enters into an administratively or judicially approved settlement with 
the EPA regarding the cleanup of a site resolving its liability to the United 
States, that party may pursue a contribution claim against other PRPs.59  
The right of contribution is limited to a three-year statute of limitations,60 
which is considerably shorter than section 107’s six-year statute of 
limitations.61  Section 113(f)(2) also gave parties an incentive to enter into 
an administratively or judicially approved settlement:  by entering into such 
settlements, a PRP cannot be held “liable for claims for contribution 
regarding matters addressed in the settlement.”62 
Although explicitly inserting the right of contribution into CERCLA 
may have been well intentioned, it added complexity and opaqueness to the 
law.63  Numerous questions arose with the newly passed legislation; 
specifically, one major question arose as to whether a PRP can seek 
contribution from another PRP for cleanup costs when no civil action has 
been brought under section 106 or section 107.64  “Most courts of appeals 
[initially] interpreted section 113(f)(1) broadly and allowed PRPs to sue 
other PRPs to recover cleanup costs at any time after cleanup costs were 
incurred.”65 
III. COOPER INDUSTRIES CHANGES THE LANDSCAPE 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. drastically limited the 
ability of PRPs to bring section 113 contribution claims against other 
PRPs.66  Cooper Industries involved contaminated aircraft engine 
maintenance sites in Texas.67  In 1981, Cooper Industries (Cooper), who 
 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2006). 
58. Id. § 9613(f)(3)(B). 
59. See id. 
60. Id. § 9613(g)(1). 
61. Id. § 9613(g)(2)(B). 
62. Id. § 9613(f)(2). 
63. RODGERS, supra note 17, at 484-86. 
64. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 567. 
65. Id. 
66. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 567. 
67. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 (2004). 
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had previously operated the sites, sold them to Aviall Services (Aviall).68  
After years of operation, Aviall discovered some facilities were 
contaminated by petroleum and other hazardous substances leaking “into 
the ground and ground water through underground storage tanks and 
spills.”69 
Aviall contacted the Texas Natural Resource Conservation 
Commission, who informed Aviall it was in violation of state 
environmental laws and directed Aviall to clean up the site.70  The 
Commission threatened action if Aviall did not clean up the site, but neither 
it nor the EPA brought any action compelling cleanup.71  In 1997, Aviall 
brought suit against Cooper, seeking to recover its cleanup costs.72  The 
question before the Court was whether a party who has not been sued under 
section 106 or section 107 is able to pursue a contribution claim against 
another party pursuant to section 113.73 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas doggedly stuck to a textualist 
approach in his interpretation of the CERCLA provisions.74  Justice Thomas 
evaluated the enabling clause of section 113(f), which states, “[a]ny person 
may seek contribution . . . during or following any civil action under” either 
section 106 or section 107 of CERCLA.75  Instead of following the judicial 
canon norm of reading the word “may” as granting discretion to the 
aggrieved party,76 Justice Thomas declared the word “may” authorizes 
action only when it has satisfied “the subsequent specified condition.”77  
Put another way, the only way a PRP (Aviall) could seek a section 113 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 163-64. 
70. Id. at 164. 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  “[The] claim alleged that, pursuant to § 113(f)(1), Aviall was entitled to seek 
contribution from Cooper, as a PRP under § 107(a), for response costs and other liability Aviall 
incurred in connection with the Texas facilities.”  Id. 
73. Id. at 160-61. 
74. Textualism is roughly defined as a method of statutory interpretation in which a judge 
looks to the statute’s literal text to interpret the law, as opposed to looking into the legislative 
history, legislative implications, or equitable considerations in interpretation.  See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1614, 356 (9th ed. 2009). 
75. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166 (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) 
(2006)). 
76. ROBERT J. MATINEAU & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, LEGAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND RULE 
DRAFTING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 49 (2005).  If there is to be a limitation on the discretionary act, 
then the limitation should include the world “only.”  Id.  For example, if Congress intended to 
limit the availability of section 113, it would have looked like this:  “A person may only seek 
contribution . . . during or following any civil action.”  See id. 
77. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 166. 
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contribution claim from another party (Cooper) is if that PRP (Aviall) has 
already been sued under section 106 or section 107.78 
Justice Thomas limited the decision by choosing not to address whether 
a party who is subject to a judicial order under section 106 constitutes a 
PRP being subject to a “civil action” to which it can bring section 113 
contribution claims against other PRPs.79  Justice Ginsburg, joined by 
Justice Stevens, dissented from the Court’s majority holding, stating 
“[f]ederal courts, prior to the enactment of § 113(f)(1), had correctly held 
that PRPs could recover [under § 107] a proportionate share of their costs in 
actions for contribution against other PRPs [and] nothing in § 113 retracts 
that right.”80 
Before Cooper Industries, the long-standing practice across the country 
was to allow a party who was not subject to section 106 or section 107 
litigation to bring a claim for contribution under section 113(f)(1) against 
other PRPs to recover the costs it voluntarily undertook to clean up a 
contaminated site.81  The decision in Cooper Industries was roundly 
criticized by commentators because it essentially discouraged parties from 
voluntarily cleaning up these sites until getting sued to do so,82 which goes 
against CERCLA’s goal of “facilitat[ing] the prompt cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites.”83  The decision was also criticized for leaving open many 
unanswered questions, particularly whether a PRP can bring a section 107 
cost recovery action against another PRP at the same site,84 as pointed out 
in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.85  These questions remained unanswered for 
years, leaving PRPs with a difficult decision:  voluntarily clean up the site 
and hope a court allows a section 107 cost recovery action, or wait to get 
sued and potentially face the increased costs and penalties of delaying the 
cleanup.86 
 
78. Id. at 160-61. 
79. Id. at 168 n.5. 
80. Id. at 174 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
81. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 567. 
82. Famira, supra note 4, at 580; Joseph Ferrucci, No Contribution Claims for Voluntary 
Cleanup of Superfund Sites:  The Troubling Supreme Court Decision in Cooper Industries v. 
Aviall Services, 12 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 73, 95 (2005); Armand M. Perry, 
Will the Legislative Branch Please Stand Up:  Ending Three Years of Uncertainty in a Post-
Cooper World, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 407, 421 (2007). 
83. OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 
1997). 
84. Cardwell, supra note 2, at 568. 
85. Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 173 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
86. See Perry, supra note 82, at 421-22. 
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IV. UNITED STATES V. ATLANTIC RESEARCH’S GUIDANCE 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Atlantic 
Research Corp., courts were struggling with understanding the relationship 
between section 113(f) contribution and section 107(a) cost recovery caused 
by the Cooper Industries decision.87  Nearly three years after Cooper 
Industries, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify its prior 
decision. 
Atlantic Research involved a site where the Atlantic Research 
Corporation (Atlantic Research) retrofitted rocket motors for the United 
States government.88  Wastewater and burned fuel from the operation 
contaminated the soil and groundwater at the site.89  Atlantic Research 
voluntarily cleaned up the site (without being subject to section 106 or 
section 107 litigation) and brought suit against the United States under 
section 107(a) to recover its costs for cleanup.90 
Justice Thomas, this time writing for a unanimous Court, explained 
how “§§ 107(a) and 113(f) provides two ‘clearly distinct’ remedies:”91 
Section 113(f) explicitly grants PRPs a right to contribution . . . .  
By contrast, § 107(a) permits recovery of cleanup costs but does 
not create a right to contribution.  A private party may recover 
under § 107(a) without any establishment of liability to a third 
party.  Moreover, § 107(a) permits a PRP to recover only the costs 
it has “incurred”92 in cleaning up a site.  When a party pays to 
satisfy a settlement agreement or a court judgment, it does not 
incur its own costs of response.  Rather, it reimburses other parties 
for costs that those parties incurred.93 
Justice Thomas further explained that it is the procedural circumstances 
of the parties involved that will determine whether section 107(a) or section 
 
87. GRAD, supra note 17, § 4A.02[1][g-1], at 4A-78.24(5)-(6). 
88. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 133 (2007). 
89. Id. 
90. Id.  Atlantic Research amended its complaint, after the Supreme Court’s Cooper 
Industries decision, from seeking relief under sections 107(a) and 113(f) to seeking relief under 
section 107(a) and the federal common law.  Id.  “The United States moved to dismiss, arguing 
that § 107(a) does not allow PRPs (such as Atlantic Research) to recover costs.”  Id. at 133-34. 
91. Id. at 138 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3 
(2004)). 
92. Justice Thomas focused on the express language in section 107(a)(4)(B), which states 
that a PRP shall be liable for “any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person 
consistent with the national contingency plan.”  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis 
added).  The national contingency plan is the federal government’s plan for responding to releases 
of hazardous substances.  Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 
121 (2d Cir. 2010). 
93. Atl. Research, 551 U.S. at 138-39 (internal citations omitted). 
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113(f) will apply.94  If a party is subject to section 106 or section 107 
litigation, then section 113(f) is that party’s vehicle for bringing a 
contribution action.95  On the other hand, if a party is not subject to section 
106 or section 107 litigation, then section 107(a) is that party’s vehicle to 
bring an action against a PRP for the costs it incurred from the cleanup.96 
Of particular relevance, Justice Thomas then distinguished (presumably 
innocent) parties who voluntarily clean up a site from parties who are 
paying money to satisfy a settlement agreement or a court judgment.97  
Those parties who enter into settlement agreements are not in the same 
procedural posture as those who voluntarily clean up a site.  “[B]y 
reimbursing response costs paid by other parties, the PRP has not incurred 
its own costs of response and therefore cannot recover under § 107(a),” 
leaving them to only pursue a section 113 contribution claim.98  However, 
Justice Thomas acknowledged that entering into a consent decree or 
administrative order under section 106 and section 107 is not the same as 
entering into a settlement agreement.  “In such a case, the PRP does not 
incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another party.”99  
Even though the opinion recognizes this gap in the law, it inexplicably 
states in a footnote it will not decide the issue.100 
Although Atlantic Research resolves some of the issues created by 
Cooper Industries, it leaves a massive gap in the law for those parties 
incurring costs stemming from administrative orders and settlements, which 
is a common scenario at Superfund sites.101  It is the commonality of 
consent decrees and administrative orders under CERCLA that makes this 
decision so odd.  “The EPA has issued more than 1,700 orders [compelling 
environmental cleanup] since CERCLA’s enactment in 1980.  That large 
number is not surprising given that [administrative orders] are ‘one of the 
most potent administrative remedies available to the [EPA] under any 
existing environmental statute.’”102  The issue has not been revisited by the 
 





99. Id. at 139 n.6. 
100. See id. 
101. Aselda Thompson, Exposing a Gap in CERCLA Case Law:  Is there a Right to Recover 
Costs Following Compliance with an Administrative Order after Atlantic and Aviall?, 46 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1679, 1699-1700 (2010). 
102. Id. at 1688-89 (quoting EPA, Guidance Memorandum on Use and Issuance of 
Administrative Orders under Section 106(a) of CERCLA 1 (Sept. 8, 1983)). 
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Supreme Court, leaving the circuit courts to wade through the mud that is 
CERCLA liability.103 
V. CIRCUIT COURTS SORT THROUGH THE MESS 
A. SIXTH CIRCUIT 
One of the first cases to reach the appellate level dealing with 
administrative orders after Atlantic Research was ITT Industries, Inc. v. 
BorgWarner, Inc.104  ITT Industries dealt with two sites contaminated with 
trichloroethylene (TCE) in Michigan, which the EPA placed on the 
National Priorities List.105  ITT Industries, Inc. (ITT) voluntarily entered 
into an Administrative Order by Consent (AOC) with the EPA to conduct a 
study to determine the source of TCE at one site (NBFF site).106  ITT 
incurred approximately two million dollars in costs in connection with the 
NBFF site.107 
Without admitting liability, ITT entered into a Consent Decree at 
another site (NBIA site) with other parties to perform the required remedial 
actions necessary to clean up the site.108  ITT incurred approximately $1.6 
million in costs in connection with the NBIA site.109  ITT brought suit 
against BorgWarner and other defendants for cost recovery under section 
107(a) and contribution under section 113(f)(3)(B).110 
The Sixth Circuit discussed the tenuous history of section 107 and 
section 113 claims and reiterated that “the appropriateness of a § 107(a) 
cost recovery or § 113(f) contribution action varies depending on the 
circumstances leading up to the action, not the identity of the parties.”111  
 
103. “[N]avigating the interplay between § 107(a) and § 113(f) remains a deeply difficult 
task.  ‘[R]ecent rulings have done little to provide the lower courts with useful guidance in 
determining which subsection of CERCLA provides a cause of action for parties seeking 
reimbursement of response costs in differing situations.’”  Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. 
Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted) (quoting New York v. 
Solvent Chem. Co., 685 F. Supp.2d 357, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
104. 506 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2008).  Technically, the Third Circuit heard a case dealing with 
administrative orders and section 107 and section 113 recovery first, but that case was not selected 
for publication in the Federal Reporter.  Montville Township v. Woodmont Builders, LLC, 244 F. 
App’x 514 (3d Cir. 2007). 
105. ITT Indus., 506 F.3d at 454.  The contamination stemmed from the manufacture of 
fishing reels.  Id. 
106. Id. at 455. 
107. Id. 
108. Id.  “The NBIA Site consists of a series of lagoons, an industrial sewer, and a country 
drain located approximately one-half mile from the NBFF site.”  Id. 
109. Id.  ITT claimed BorgWarner was responsible for some of the response costs for 
discharges of hazardous substances into the lagoons and a country drain.  Id. 
110. Id. at 454. 
111. Id. at 458. 
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Citing Atlantic Research, the Sixth Circuit noted a section 107 claim may 
be pursued when a PRP has “incurred” the cleanup costs on its own (and is 
not reimbursing other parties), whereas a section 113 claim may be pursued 
when a PRP has been subject to a section 106 or section 107 action, or has 
“entered into a judicially or administratively approved settlement.”112  At 
first glance, this would make one think the AOC constitutes a judicially or 
administratively approved settlement, allowing ITT to bring its section 113 
claim. 
However, after reviewing the AOC, the Sixth Circuit determined ITT 
did not resolve its liability with the United States, as is required to move 
forward on a section 113(f)(3)(B) claim.113  ITT did voluntarily enter into 
the AOC with the EPA, but that agreement expressly reserved the EPA with 
the “rights to legal action to adjudicate [ITT’s] liability for failure to 
comply with the AOC, for costs of response (past, present, or future), for 
costs of injunctive relief or enforcement, criminal liability, and other 
damages.”114  Further, ITT repeatedly made clear that its entering into the 
AOC in no way was an indication of liability on its behalf.115  The 
availability of a contribution claim hinges on a party resolving its 
liability;116 therefore, by repeatedly denying liability, ITT essentially closed 
the door for its section 113 contribution claim.117 
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine if 
ITT could pursue a section 107 cost recovery action.118  Looking again to 
Atlantic Research, the Sixth Circuit stated “CERCLA provides PRPs with a 
cause of action to recover costs incurred from remedial action regarding a 
contaminated site under § 107(a).”119  Punting the issue, the Sixth Circuit 
stated it had “no opinion as to how [ITT’s] cost recovery action ultimately 
should be resolved.  Rather, we leave it to the district court to entertain this 
question in light of Atlantic Research.”120 
 
112. Id. (citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 (2007)). 
113. Id. at 459. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 460. 
116. 42. U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2006). 
117. ITT Indus., 506 F.3d at 460.  The Sixth Circuit also stated the AOC in this case was 
entered into under section 122(a), which essentially gives the EPA the right to allow a PRP to 
perform a response action if the agency determines that party will do the action appropriately.  Id. 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a)).  In order for a settlement to be considered “an administratively or 
judicially approved settlement,” ITT would have had to enter into the AOC pursuant to section 
122(h) or section 122(g), which relate to de minimus settlements and cost recovery settlements, 
respectively.  Id.  The Sixth Circuit came to this conclusion by evaluating how the Supreme Court 
used those sections to discern the applicability of section 113.  Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 458. 
120. Id. at 460. 
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B. SECOND CIRCUIT 
In 2010, the Second Circuit decided Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,121 a case that is “yet another in a series of cases that 
attempt to chart the contours of liability” of PRPs under section 107 and 
section 113.122  This case involved Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 
(NiMo) voluntarily entering into an AOC with New York’s Department of 
Environmental Conservation (DEC).123  Unlike the AOC in ITT Industries, 
NiMo’s AOC explicitly stated it had “resolved its liability to the State for 
purposes of contribution protection provided by CERCLA Section 
113(f)(2).”124  NiMo brought suit against numerous defendants to recoup its 
costs.125 
The Second Circuit determined section 113 is the only available claim 
for NiMo.126  The factual background behind the AOC agreement supports 
a section 113 claim, as NiMo accepted responsibility and paid for the 
response costs associated with the cleanup.127  Recognizing Congress 
explicitly added section 113 contribution claims in SARA, the Second 
Circuit stated that allowing “NiMo to proceed under § 107(a) would in 
effect nullify the SARA amendment and abrogate the requirements 
Congress placed on contribution claims under § 113.”128 
The opinion then explained the rationale behind letting PRPs, such as 
NiMo, have a right to contribution: 
Congress sought to further incentivize PRPs to pay for their role in 
the creation of a hazardous waste site regardless of when they 
polluted.  To that end, parties seeking contribution-by definition 
PRPs who have already been charged with liability and resolved 
their exposure . . . -must be granted sufficient opportunity to 
pursue other PRPs and have the costs of cleanup borne equitably 
with others liable under the statute.129 
The rule of law that emerges from Niagara Mohawk is that when a 
PRP sustains remediation costs under an AOC with a State, that PRP may 
pursue a section 113 contribution action against other PRPs as long as the 
AOC contains explicit language releasing the section 113 action bringing 
 
121. 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010). 
122. Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 117-18. 
123. Id. at 119. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 118-19. 
126. Id. at 124. 
127. Id. at 127-28. 
128. Id. at 128. 
129. Id. at 132 (internal citations omitted). 
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PRP from CERCLA liability.130  Comparing this case to ITT Industries, it is 
clear how crucial the language of an AOC can be.  Without such language, 
the client can be stuck without a claim as in ITT Industries;131 however, 
when explicit language in the AOC resolves liability, like it did in Niagara 
Mohawk, the client can move forward on a section 113 contribution 
claim,132 potentially recovering millions of dollars. 
C. THIRD CIRCUIT 
In a case that dealt with “the disposal of millions of gallons of toxic 
waste, over a six year time period, by more than twenty parties, with 
millions of dollars of cleanup costs at stake,” the Third Circuit came to a 
slightly different conclusion regarding PRP recovery suits in Agere 
Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Environmental Technology Corp.133  After the 
EPA determined the contaminated site, the Boarhead Site, was to be a 
Superfund site, it commenced a section 107 cost recovery suit against 
multiple parties.134  That litigation ended in a Consent Decree where the 
PRPs were to do the cleanup work and reimburse the EPA for the costs 
connected with the cleanup.135  Agere was neither a party to the section 107 
action nor the Consent Decree, but it did enter into a private settlement with 
the parties of the Consent Decree.136  At the time the case was decided, 
Agere had contributed $902,152.49 towards the cleanup.137  Agere and the 
members of the Consent Decree brought suit against twenty-three other 
defendants seeking to recoup the costs of the cleanup at the Boarhead 
Site.138 
The Third Circuit recognized Agere’s unique position, as it had not 
been subject to section 106 or section 107 proceedings, nor had it entered 
into an administratively or judicially approved settlement, which would 
technically bar Agere from pursuing a section 113 contribution claim 
 
130. Id. at 124-25, 140.  Cf. W.R. Grace & Co-Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 91 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (ruling that a PRP cannot bring a section 113 contribution claim when its settlement 
with the DEC made no reference to CERCLA, stated the settlement only handled state law claims, 
and left open the possibility that the DEC or the EPA could bring CERCLA or other claims). 
131. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 460 (6th Cir. 2007). 
132. Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 125-26. 
133. 602 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2010). 
134. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 211-12. 
135. Id. at 212-13. 
136. Id. at 213. 
137. Id. at 224. 
138. Id. at 213-14.  Agere and the other plaintiffs brought suit for both cost recovery and 
contribution.  Id. 
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pursuant to Cooper Industries.139  Relying on the precedent in Atlantic 
Research, the Third Circuit determined Agere had “incurred” costs in 
cleaning up the site.140 
Agere . . . put their money in the pot right along with the money 
from the signers of the consent decrees.  The costs they paid for 
were incurred at the same time as the costs incurred by the signers 
of the consent decrees and for the same work.  Those costs were 
incurred in the ordinary sense that a bill one obligates oneself to 
pay comes due as a job gets done.141 
The Third Circuit explained if it were to hold Agere did not have a 
section 107 claim, it would be completely barred from seeking recovery, 
which would go against CERCLA’s goal of encouraging parties to 
promptly clean up hazardous sites and later be able to recover from other 
parties for the cleanup.142  “When a company in the position of 
Agere . . . has not yet been sued by the EPA but appreciates that it bears 
some responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste, the language of 
CERCLA, which is intended to encourage cleanup, ought not be interpreted 
to discourage participation in cleanup.”143  Allowing parties like Agere to 
recover the costs it incurred to help pay for a cleanup from other parties 
encourages participation in environmental cleanups, even if those costs are 
associated with a private party settlement obligation.144 
The Third Circuit also ruled the other plaintiffs in the case, those who 
entered into the consent decrees with the EPA, were not able to pursue a 
section 107 cost recovery claim.145  Section 113(f)(2) shields parties who 
enter into settlements with the government from other contribution claims 
over issues relating to the settlement.146  If the court allowed a section 107 
claim in such a circumstance, the defendant PRP would be unable to bring a 
contribution claim and would be held fully liable under CERCLA’s joint 
and several liability.147  The Third Circuit says such an outcome would be 
 
139. Id. at 225-26.  Cooper Industries held a party can only seek a contribution claim from 
other PRPs if it has been subject to section 106 or section 107 litigation.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 160-61 (2004). 
140. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 225.  “[Section] 107(a) permits a PRP to recover only the 
costs it has ‘incurred’ in cleaning up a site.”  United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 
139 (2007). 
141. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 225. 
142. Id. at 226. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 229. 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006). 
147. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 229. 
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perverse, stating, “while joint and several liability allows a plaintiff to 
collect from a single defendant the collective liability of all defendants, it 
does not permit a plaintiff to recover from a defendant the costs to undo 
what the plaintiff itself has done.”148  Therefore, the proper action for 
plaintiffs who have entered into administrative or judicially approved 
settlements is a section 113 contribution claim.149 
D. EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
One of the more recent cases involving CERCLA liability under 
section 107 and section 113 was heard by the Eighth Circuit in Morrison 
Enterprises, LLC v. Dravo Corp.150  After the EPA discovered a 
contaminated water production well in Nebraska, it contacted Morrison 
Enterprises (Morrison), the City of Hastings (City), and the Dravo 
Corporation (Dravo) to inform them they were potentially liable for the 
contamination.151 
The EPA “determined that three of the sources for the contamination 
were a grain elevator operated by one of Morrison’s predecessors, a 
manufacturing plant run by Dravo, and a city landfill.”152  The EPA entered 
into a series of AOCs and consent decrees with the City and Morrison that 
ultimately led to the parties extracting and treating groundwater that was 
contaminated with their contaminants of concern (COCs) as well as TCE, 
even though Morrison claimed to have never used or released TCE.153  The 
EPA also entered into a consent decree with Dravo to clean up its TCE 
contamination at another sub-site.154  Morrison and the City brought suit 
under both section 107 and section 113 against Dravo to recover their costs 
of cleaning up the TCE.155 
The Eighth Circuit determined neither Morrison nor the City can 
pursue a section 107 cost recovery claim.156  The court stated that unlike the 
voluntary plaintiff in Atlantic Research, who had not been subject to section 
106 or section 107 litigation, both Morrison and the City had been subject 
to such litigation.157  “Response costs incurred pursuant 
 
148. Id. at 229. 
149. Id. 
150. 638 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2011). 
151. Morrison Enters. LLC, 638 F.3d at 599. 
152. 8th Circuit Rejects Cost-Recovery Action for Involuntary Cleanup, 31 No. 21 WJENV 2 
(2011). 
153. Morrison Enters. LLC, 638 F.3d at 599-601. 
154. Id. at 601. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 604-05. 
157. Id. at 604. 
          
2012] NOTE 229 
to . . . administrative settlements following a suit under § 106 or § 107(a) 
are not incurred voluntarily.”158 
The court acknowledged the TCE at Dravo’s site migrated to the other 
sites, but held Morrison and the City were still liable for the entire cleanup: 
Under CERCLA, if a responsible party . . . releases hazardous 
materials into the environment, and that release causes the 
incurrence of response costs, then the party is liable . . . for any 
other necessary cost of response incurred by any other person . . . .  
When multiple parties are liable for response costs, the focus then 
shifts to allocation.159 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned Morrison, the City, and Dravo all shared 
liability for contaminating the groundwater with various contaminants, and 
therefore, all three shared liability for cleaning up the contamination, both 
theirs and others.160  Although the Eighth Circuit definitively ruled entering 
into AOCs bars cost recovery under section 107, it clearly allowed for 
plaintiffs who have entered into AOCs to use section 113, as “[t]his shared 
liability is sufficient to support a § 113(f) contribution claim.”161 
VI. LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD 
A. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW 
If the reader is confused about exactly where the line is drawn between 
section 107 and section 113, he or she should not be surprised.  Judges and 
commentators openly admit understanding the relationship between section 
107 and section 113 is extremely difficult.162  However, after evaluating all 
the cases discussed above, legal practitioners and scholars can potentially 
understand the evolution of CERCLA liability under section 107 and 
section 113. 
The Supreme Court, in Cooper Industries, stated a PRP who has not 
been subject to a section 106 or section 107 suit may not bring a 
contribution claim under section 113, changing years of lower court 
precedent and practice.163  It followed that ruling three years later with 
 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 605 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
160. Id. at 606-07. 
161. Id. at 607. 
162. Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“[N]avigating the interplay between § 107(a) and § 113(f) remains a deeply difficult task.”  Id. 
163. Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157,160-61 (2004). 
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Atlantic Research, which stated a party who voluntarily cleans up a site can 
pursue a cost recovery action under section 107.164 
The Sixth Circuit, in ITT Industries, stated a party who enters into an 
AOC without admitting or resolving liability cannot bring a section 113 
contribution claim.165  The Second Circuit, in Niagara Mohawk, ruled a 
settlement agreement that explicitly states a party has resolved its liability 
to the State (or the EPA) qualifies that PRP to bring section 113 
contribution claims against other PRPs.166  The Third Circuit, in Agere 
Systems, determined that allowing a party who has entered into private 
settlement agreements (not with the government) to pursue section 107 cost 
recovery actions promotes the goals of CERCLA.167  Finally, the Eighth 
Circuit, in Morrison Enterprises, ruled that entering into an AOC 
essentially bars a PRP from pursuing a section 107 cost recovery action, 
and the only action available is a section 113 contribution claim.168 
B. WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
Most commentators agree that although the Supreme Court has been 
placed in a tough spot of interpreting a poorly drafted statute, it has failed 
“to clarify the statute and thereby give direct guidance to [PRPs].”169  This 
leaves the circuit courts and PRPs to discern the proper interpretation of the 
statute in allocating liability.  For the time being, it is the circuit courts who 
bear the responsibility to determine the interplay between section 107 and 
section 113. 
1. (Lack of) Legislative Response Potential 
Unfortunately, any hope of fixing the statutory language of CERCLA, 
as amended by SARA, through the legislative branch is unrealistic.  What 
was supposed to be a quick passage of SARA in 1986 turned into a 
dramatic storyline involving “prolonged bouts of stalemate, gamesmanship, 
bluffs, threats,” threats of pocket veto, and Congress pledging to stay in 
 
164. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 135-36 (2007). 
165. ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 459-60 (6th Cir. 2007). 
166. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 126-28, 140 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
167. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 225-26. 
168. Morrison Enters., LLC, v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 604 (8th Cir. 2011).  “[A] PRP 
can bring a claim under § 107(a) if it is foreclosed from bringing a claim under § 113(f), but that, 
conversely, a PRP must proceed under § 113(f) if § 113(f) is available to it.”  Morrison Enters., 
LLC v. Dravo Corp., No. 4:08CV3142, 2009 WL 4330224 at *8 (D. Neb. Nov. 24, 2009). 
169. Thompson, supra note 101, at 1706-07; O’REILLY, supra note 19, § 3:6.  “Two 
Supreme Court opinions by Justice Clarence Thomas have been the source of much of the worst 
confusion and, to be frank, have caused years of wasted effort in the evolution of Superfund law.”  
Id. 
          
2012] NOTE 231 
session to override any veto.170  Furthering the Congressional drama, in 
1995, the Republican-led Congress discontinued the tax on the petroleum 
and chemical industries, leaving taxpayers to foot the bill for the Superfund 
cleanups.171  CERCLA’s stormy past combined with the American public’s 
extremely low opinion of Congress today,172 leaves little hope the 
legislative branch will do anything to bring clarification to the law. 
2. Using Circuit Court Precedent 
Easier said than done, a PRP needs to take a hard look at its past, its 
predecessors’ past, and determine the plausibility that it may have 
contributed to the contamination.  If it has contributed, it should 
immediately take actions to abate such contamination.  Not only is this the 
morally superior thing to do, it makes business and financial sense for the 
PRP.  Taking prompt action avoids steep statutory penalties and will allow 
that PRP to have some recourse against other PRPs, either through section 
107 or section 113. 
Although each case regarding CERCLA liability will undoubtedly be 
filled with complexities in both the facts and the law, and there is no 
guarantee of action by Congress or the Supreme Court, a PRP can take 
affirmative steps in the light of some circuit court precedent.  If a PRP 
recognizes it bears some responsibility for the contamination at a site, yet is 
lucky enough to not be subject section 106 or section 107 litigation, it may 
still enter into private settlements with PRPs who are subject to such 
litigation.173  That PRP may pursue cost recovery actions against those 
parties who have not entered into such agreements, while the parties subject 
to section 106 or section 107 litigation can bring contribution claims against 
those PRPs who decided not to engage in the settlements or the cleanup.174 
If a PRP finds itself subject to section 106 or section 107 action 
brought by either the State or the EPA and determines it will make good 
business sense to enter into a settlement or AOC, admitting liability and 
expressly stating the liability has been resolved allows a party to bring a 
section 113 claim against other parties and shields those parties from other 
section 113 claims.175  Although entering into an AOC will close the 
 
170. RODGERS, supra note 17, at 483-84. 
171. Broder, supra note 10, at A16. 
172. Chris Cillizza, Congress’ Approval Problem in One Chart, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 
2011, 12:09 PM ET), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/congress-approval-
problem-in-one-chart/2011/11/15/gIQAkHmtON_blog.html. 
173. Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2010). 
174. Id. at 228-29. 
175. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 126-28, 140 (2d 
Cir. 2010).  Although there is some concern a party who enters into an administratively or 
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possibility to recover one hundred percent of the costs incurred by the PRP, 
it allows that PRP to pursue contribution claims against other PRPs, 
potentially being able to recover millions of dollars.176 
If a PRP is found subject to litigation under section 106 or section 107, 
it behooves that PRP to enter into a settlement to avoid further liability (the 
prompt cleanup).  The current state of the law does not allow for a one 
hundred percent recovery of cleanup costs if a party has been subject to 
section 106 or section 107 litigation, as that would defeat the “polluter 
pays” principle.177  Instead, the proper course is for that PRP to seek out 
other PRPs under a section 113 contribution claim, ensuring all parties who 
are liable pay for their fair share of the contamination. 
For the most part, the holdings of the circuit courts, while bound to the 
textualist precedent of the Supreme Court, have been able to utilize 
CERCLA’s goals of promoting the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites 
and the “polluter pays” principle.178  Until common sense at the Supreme 
Court or Congressional level returns an implied right of contribution under 
section 107, as Justice Ginsburg suggests,179 circuit courts should take an 
extra effort to follow, to the extent they can, CERCLA’s goals of ensuring 
parties responsible for the contamination clean up the contamination as 
quickly as possible while ensuring that all parties liable for the 
contamination pay their fair share in the cost of remediation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The landscape surrounding CERCLA liability is constantly in a state of 
flux.  Supreme Court precedent in Atlantic Research and Cooper Industries 
 
judicially approved settlement may still be subject to a section 107 cost recovery claim, that 
settling party can counterclaim with section 113 for contribution.  Elizabeth E. Mack & Angela D. 
Hodges, LAW 360, Settling CERCLA Section 107 Claims (Feb. 3, 2009), 
http://www.lockelord.com/files/News/d5a8d743-f590-423d-b45b-29502cc6042f/Presentation/ 
NewsAttachment/5f943a19-9f75-425f-96ac-2b35f9b105d4/2009-02_SettlingCERCLASection107 
Claims_MackHodges.pdf.  Odds are that since the EPA has already calculated the settling PRP’s 
fair share in its settlement that a section 107 plaintiff is going to have a very difficult time 
showing the settling party should pay more.  Id.  “Accordingly, if the settlement otherwise makes 
good business sense, the gap in contribution protection should not be a disincentive to 
settlement. . . .  The imperfect world of contribution protection after Atlantic Research should not 
deter settlements that otherwise make good business sense.”  Id. 
176. Morrison Enters., LLC, v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594, 604 (8th Cir. 2011). 
177. Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 229. 
178. Niagara Mohawk, 596 F.3d at 130-31 (using the two main goals of CERCLA in its 
analysis:  “remediation of sites that present a clear and present danger to the health and well-being 
of the communities in which they are located and identification of the source, or sources, of [the] 
hazardous materials.”); Agere Sys., Inc., 602 F.3d at 225 (stating the thought that “the Supreme 
Court did not intend to deprive the word ‘incurred’ of its ordinary meaning” in its decision in 
Atlantic Research). 
179. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 174 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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changed the contours of PRP liability suits significantly.  The current status 
of determining CERCLA liability under section 107 and section 113 is 
anything but clear or ideal, but if Congress or the Supreme Court were to 
embark on transforming the current statutory landscape, history warns that 
they may well make things worse.  PRPs, while stuck in a difficult situation 
regarding action upon the discovery of a contaminated site, can take some 
action under circuit court precedent to minimize its liability to other parties 
and, if the facts support their position, seek out either section 107 cost 
recovery claims or section 113 contribution from PRPs. 
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